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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Three kinds of innovation are commonly associated with the early 
federal courts: establishing the institution of judicial review without any 
clear authorization for doing so, using judicial review to define property 
rights more expansively than would have been anticipated by contemporaries, 
and employing fundamental principles derived from natural or “higher” 
law for this purpose.1  I will argue that the early federal courts were far 
less innovative in these three respects than most scholars have supposed.  
First, the Framers of the Federal Constitution seem to have anticipated 
that the new federal courts would exercise the power of judicial review, 
and to have understood judicial review as a judicial practice that did not 
require specific authorization in a written constitution.2  Second, the 
Framers expected that in exercising the power of judicial review the 
federal courts would protect certain conventional property rights not 
stated in constitutional provisions.3  Third, as the Framers expected, the 
federal courts of this era neither relied on nor endorsed using higher law 
as a basis for determining the validity of statutes affecting property 
rights.4 
II.  AT THE FOUNDING: TWO PARAMETERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The subject of judicial review came up from time to time during the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787.  Twelve delegates made remarks that 
seem to assume some form of judicial review as an ordinary judicial 
practice.5  No delegate manifested a lack of familiarity with the concept.  
Some delegates had already exercised the power of judicial review 
themselves, as state court judges,6 or advocated the lawfulness of 
 
 1. Higher law in this context refers to “a law that is not written in constitutions 
but which is behind and beneath such documents, a law that man does not make but 
which he may discover and apply.”  BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN 
INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 297 (1931). 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 5–22. 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 24–38. 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 39–55. 
 5. See NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY 
JAMES MADISON (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1987) (Elbridge Gerry, Rufus 
King at 61; Roger Sherman, James Madison, Gouverneur Morris at 304–05; James 
Wilson, Nathaniel Gorham at 336–37; Gouverneur Morris at 339; Luther Martin at 340; 
George Mason at 341; John Rutledge at 343; James Madison at 352–53; Gouverneur 
Morris at 463; Oliver Ellsworth at 510; Hugh Williamson at 511; James Wilson at 518; 
James Madison at 539; Gouverneur Morris at 542; James Madison at 543; and James 
Madison at 631). 
 6. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the 
“Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1030 
(2001). 
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judicial review as attorneys.7  Courts in at least seven states had already 
exercised or endorsed some form of judicial review.8  A majority of the 
delegates had legal training.9  Delegates James Madison and Alexander 
Hamilton, writing later as Publius, took judicial review for granted in 
discussing the future federal courts.10 
No provision in the proposed Constitution referred to judicial review, 
however.11  Judicial review was never the subject of sustained discussion 
at the Convention, and no delegate moved to authorize the federal courts 
to exercise judicial review.  Two delegates expressed disapproval.12  Before 
the Convention, the power of judicial review had generated considerable 
opposition13 as well as approval.14  Some scholars have concluded that 
the Convention did not reach any meaningful consensus as to whether or 
how the federal courts would exercise a power of judicial review, and 
accordingly discounted the Convention proceedings as a source reflecting 
contemporary understanding of judicial review or expectations regarding 
how it would be practiced by the federal courts.15 
 
 7. See William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 455, 490 (2005). 
 8. See CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
88–121 (2d ed. 1932); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1135–45 (1987); Treanor, supra note 7, at 475–97. 
 9. See Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1037. 
 10. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524–28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961).  According to Hamilton, opponents of ratification had “upon many 
occasions” decried “the supposed danger of judiciary encroachments on the legislative 
authority.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), id., at 545. 
 11. Judicial review is arguably implied by Article III, Section 2, and Article VI. 
 12. See NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5 (John Mercer at 462 and John Dickinson 
at 463).  Dickinson said he was “at the same time at a loss what expedient to substitute.”  
Id. at 463.  Mercer and Dickinson represented Maryland and Delaware, respectively; 
apparently neither states’ courts had yet exercised or endorsed judicial review.  See 
HAINES, supra note 8, at 88–121. 
 13. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 
93–99 (1988); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–
1787, at 302–05, 459 (1998); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 132–35 (1893). 
 14. According to Elbridge Gerry, state judges had “set aside laws as being 
[against] the Constitution. . . . with general approbation.”  See NOTES OF DEBATES, supra 
note 5, at 61. 
 15. LEVY, supra note 13, at 99–110; SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 42–43 (1990); J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG 
ROBE 230–32 (1989); Treanor, supra note 7, at 469–70.  But see SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, 
TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 112 (1995); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND 
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 175–76 (1996); Sherry, supra note 8, at 1129. 
HART.FINAL.DOC 10/15/2008  10:14:14 AM 
 
826 
The question of whether the Convention intended to authorize judicial 
review reflects a dubious premise: that delegates would have thought the 
federal courts needed formal authorization to conduct judicial review.  
State courts were exercising the power of judicial review already, 
without any authorization in their states’ constitutions.16  Judicial review 
had never been formally authorized in England, where Chief Justice 
Coke had memorably claimed the power to determine the validity of 
Acts of Parliament according to longstanding common law principles.17  
American patriots, too, had invoked an unwritten, ancient English constitution 
that set limits to the power of Parliament.18  English and American courts 
that had exercised judicial review or endorsed it in principle always 
explained it as an inherent or implied duty.19  Therefore the fact that the 
Convention did not formally authorize judicial review does not imply 
that the delegates were undecided about judicial review or opposed to it.  
Given the fact that courts practicing or endorsing judicial review had 
never regarded formal authorization from outside the courts as essential, 
Convention delegates probably thought that federal judges would feel 
they had the authority to exercise this notionally conventional power 
unless the Constitution prohibited judicial review.20 
Regardless of whether the Convention proceedings might be regarded 
as reflecting any consensus among the delegates regarding the legitimacy or 
the likelihood of judicial review in the federal courts, however, the 
Convention provides a useful baseline for evaluating the degree of 
innovation practiced by the federal courts in later years.  Delegates who 
seemed to take judicial review for granted showed a consistent or 
compatible understanding of the scope of judicial review in two basic 
 
 16. Sherry, supra note 8, at 1135. 
 17. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 653 (K.B. 1610); see Edward S. 
Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. 
REV. 365, 367–73 (1928).  Some scholars have concluded that Bonham’s Case was 
intended to address statutory construction rather than judicial review, and Coke himself 
later wrote that Parliament’s legislative power was absolute.  EDWARDO COKE, THE FOURTH 
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF 
COURTS 36 (1797).  Eighteenth-century Americans, however, seem to have understood 
Bonham’s Case as asserting a power of judicial review. 
 18. See CHARLES F. MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
1760–1776, at 43–49 (1933); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 75–76 (1986); Corwin, supra note 
17, at 394–98 (suggesting that the influence of Bonham’s Case was felt in America as 
early as the seventeenth century); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: 
Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 865–69 
(1978). 
 19. See Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 18, 
23–26 (2003). 
 20. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 543; 
Hamburger, supra note 19, at 38–40. 
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respects.  First, they anticipated that the fundamental law used by courts 
to determine the validity of statutes under the Federal Constitution would 
not consist merely of the constitutional text.21  Second, they assumed 
that the federal courts would not invoke natural law or natural rights 
principles as a test of the validity of a statute.22  Questions of property 
rights and economic liberty figured prominently in the delegates’ 
hypothetical discussions of judicial review, so their discussions can offer 
useful if fragmentary evidence regarding the Framers’ perceptions and 
expectations of how judicial review would apply to statutes modifying 
rights of property owners and other economic actors in the new federal 
courts. 
A.  Judicial Review Would Not Be Confined to                                        
Enforcing the Constitutional Text 
Those Convention delegates who assumed that the federal courts 
would exercise judicial review evidently expected that federal courts 
would declare some kinds of laws void even if they did not violate a 
constitutional provision.  Oliver Ellsworth said it was not “necessary” to 
prohibit the national legislature from enacting ex post facto laws, 
because “there was no lawyer, no civilian23 who would not say that ex 
post facto laws were void of themselves.”24  Ellsworth evidently assumed 
that federal ex post facto laws, if challenged in court, would be declared 
void even if the Constitution did not expressly prohibit them, because 
the illegitimacy of ex post facto laws—among “the first principles of 
Legislation,” according to James Wilson25—was already so well-established.  
Similarly, Gouverneur Morris opposed expressly prohibiting states from 
interfering with private contracts because “[t]he [j]udicial power of the 
U.S. will be a protection in cases within their jurisdiction.”26  No delegate 
 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 24–38. 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 39–55. 
 23. By “civilian” Ellsworth meant someone who is an expert in civil law.  
Similarly, Daniel Carroll refers to “civilians or others.”  NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 
5, at 511. 
 24. Id. at 510.  Justice Thompson made a similar assertion in Ogden v. Saunders, 
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 303–04 (1827) (“No [s]tate [c]ourt would, I presume, sanction 
and enforce an ex post facto law, if no such prohibition was contained in the constitution 
of the United States.”). 
 25. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5, at 511. 
 26. Id. at 542. 
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challenged the premise that courts would use such well-established 
extratextual principles in judicial review.27 
James Madison reminded fellow delegates that in Rhode Island, “the 
Judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced.”28  
This was an allusion to Trevett v. Weeden, in which the highest court of 
Rhode Island had declared void a new law requiring creditors to accept 
paper money as legal tender for existing debts.29  Madison and other 
delegates, evidently familiar with the existing state constitutions, would 
have known that Rhode Island had chosen to keep its colonial charter 
instead of adopting a written constitution,30 and understood that the 
Rhode Island court had not relied on a written provision of fundamental 
law in overturning the tender law.  Some probably knew that in Connecticut, 
the other state without a written constitution, the highest court had 
already held a statute void,31 and that other states’ courts had held 
statutes void on grounds not articulated in their written constitutions.32  
Roger Sherman, responding to George Mason’s proposal to add a federal 
bill of rights to the Constitution, said that a bill of rights was unnecessary: 
“The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution; 
and being in force are sufficient.”33  Sherman’s remark seems to imply 
that individual rights recited in state bills of rights would not become 
unavailable to litigants challenging a federal statute simply because they 
were not recited in the Federal Constitution.  Some of those present 
would have known that state judges had endorsed using principles 
inferable from written constitutions as grounds for declaring a statute 
void,34 and that principles of the unwritten English constitution, as 
 
 27. The Convention later expressly prohibited ex post facto laws.  U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 9, cl. 3.  This does not necessarily mean that the delegates disagreed with the 
statements of Ellsworth and Morris about fundamental law, however.  Some delegates 
questioned whether courts would have the fortitude to declare statutes void despite 
pressure from the legislature.  NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5, at 304–05. 
 28. Id. at 305. 
 29. Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. 1786).  Although the court’s opinion in Trevett v. 
Weeden was never published, the defendant’s argument appeared as a pamphlet.  See 1 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 417–29 (1971). 
 30. 1 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
PEOPLE, 1776–1850, at 129 (1898). 
 31. The Symsbury Case, 1 Kirby 444 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1785); see Treanor, supra 
note 7, at 487–89.  Connecticut had declared its independence by an act of the legislature 
stating that the colony charter of 1662 would “remain the Civil Constitution of this 
State.”  1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 289–90.  The act contained a very brief recital of 
rights, consisting essentially of due process.  Id. at 290. 
 32. Elbridge Gerry asserted that in Massachusetts the governor’s salary was 
“secured by the spirit of the Constitution.”  NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5, at 39. 
 33. Id. at 630.  Mason responded that “[t]he Laws of the U.S. are to be paramount 
to State Bills of Rights,” an objection Sherman left unanswered.  Id. 
 34. See Treanor, supra note 7, at 474–75, 485–86, 488–89, 493–495. 
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conceived by Americans, had been invoked by attorneys as grounds for 
holding statutes void in state courts.35 
During the ratification process, Federalist writers consistently argued 
that citizens’ rights would remain enforceable, responding to complaints 
that the proposed federal constitution lacked a bill of rights.36  In 
Federalist No. 44, Madison considerably expanded the scope of Ellsworth’s 
argument at the Convention that ex post facto laws were void regardless 
of any specific prohibition in a written constitution: 
Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of 
contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every 
principle of sound legislation.  The two former are expressly prohibited by the 
declarations prefixed to some of the State Constitutions, and all of them are 
prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters.  Our own 
experience has taught us nevertheless, that additional fences against these 
dangers ought not to be omitted.37 
Similarly, some Anti-Federalist advocates contended that the federal 
courts would go beyond the literal text of the Constitution in finding 
grounds for declaring state statutes void.  Brutus, for example, warned that 
the federal courts would be “empowered, to explain the constitution 
according to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the 
words or letter.”38 
 
 35. See 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 357 (Julius Goebel Jr. ed., 
Columbia Univ. Press 1964); 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 419–21. 
 36. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 579 
(“[B]ills of rights, in the sense and in the extent they are contended for, . . . would even 
be dangerous.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), id., at 154 n.* (“New-
York has no bill of her rights . . . .  No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions of 
[some of] the other States . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), id., at 247 
(“Is a Bill of Rights essential to liberty?”). 
 37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), id., at 301 (emphasis added).  This 
passage was quoted with approval by Justice Thompson in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 
(12 Wheat.) 213, 304–05 (1827).  See also id. at 312 (“[The Contracts Clause stated] a 
great, yet not a new principle.  It is a principle inherent in every sound and just system of 
laws, independent of express constitutional restraints.”) (second emphasis added); id. at 
266 (majority opinion) (“[Bills of attainder and ex post facto laws] are oppressive, 
unjust, and tyrannical, and, as such, are condemned by the universal sentence of civilized 
man.”). 
 38. Essays of Brutus No. 11, in THE ESSENTIAL FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST 
PAPERS 83 (David Wootton ed., 2003). 
HART.FINAL.DOC 10/15/2008  10:14:14 AM 
 
830 
B.  Courts Would Not Use Natural Rights As a Basis for                       
Declaring a Statute Void 
Some scholars have inferred that Convention delegates intended or 
expected that courts would use natural law or natural rights in judging 
the validity of a statute.39  This exaggerates the scope of judicial review 
reflected in the proceedings.  Although the delegates repeatedly referred 
to existing or hypothetical laws as “unjust,”40 and left important questions 
of economic justice exposed to the vagaries of national politics,41 they 
did not expect courts to declare a law void simply because it was unjust.  
For the Framers, justice and law were distinct domains; injustice did not 
entail unconstitutionality.  Delegates distinguished between laws that 
were unjust and laws that a reviewing court would pronounce void.  James 
Wilson, a future law professor and Supreme Court Justice, said, “Laws 
may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; 
and yet may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in 
refusing to give them effect.”42  Similarly, George Mason, the prominent 
Virginia lawyer credited with drafting the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights, stressed this distinction while arguing that the federal judiciary 
should assist the executive in exercising the veto power over bills passed 
by Congress.  The judges, he said, “could declare an unconstitutional law 
void.  But with respect to every law[,] however unjust[,] oppressive or 
pernicious, which did not come plainly under this description, they 
would be under the necessity as Judges to give it a free course.”43  
Madison’s later comments on Jefferson’s draft of a constitution for 
Virginia also treated injustice and unconstitutionality as distinct.44 
 
 39. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 139–44; see generally Grey, supra note 18; Sherry, 
supra note 8, at 1158–60. 
 40. See NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5 (James Madison at 77; James Madison at 
145; Gouverneur Morris at 255; James Wilson at 337; George Mason at 341; Oliver 
Ellsworth at 498; and James Madison at 543). 
 41. The Convention declined to prohibit Congress from interfering with the 
obligation of contract, despite Elbridge Gerry’s efforts.  Id. at 642.  Madison was unable 
to secure consensus for drafting a contract clause that would ban state laws altering the 
obligation of future contracts as well as laws altering the obligation of contracts already 
in being.  Id. at 542–43.  The Convention did not prohibit Congress from issuing bills of 
credit or making something other than gold or silver a legal tender, though these issues 
were discussed.  Id. at 470–71.  Paper money had generally been regarded as unjust.  
E.g., id. at 144. 
 42. Id. at 337. 
 43. Id. at 341. 
 44. See James Madison, Observations on Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution for 
Virginia, in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 652 (Philip B. Kurland et al. ed., 1987) (“A 
revisionary power is meant as a check to precipitate, to unjust, and to unconstitutional 
laws.”). 
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Hamilton’s discussion of the judiciary in Federalist No. 78, similarly, 
distinguishes between “infractions of the constitution” and “the injury of 
the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial 
laws.”45  Laws violating the Constitution could be declared void, but all 
that courts could do with “unjust and partial laws” would be to construe 
them narrowly, “mitigating the severity, and confining the operation of 
such laws.”46  Similarly, Hamilton elsewhere refers in the alternative to a 
“pernicious or unconstitutional law.”47 
James Madison, who categorically condemned state laws affecting 
contracts as unjust,48 urged the Convention to give Congress an absolute 
power to veto state laws instead of merely prohibiting the states from 
interfering with contracts.  “Evasions might and would be devised by the 
ingenuity of [state] Legislatures.”49  Similarly, Madison later argued that 
the “jurisdiction of the supreme Court” would be “insufficient” to prevent 
“injurious acts of the States” because of “all the shapes which these 
could assume;” a “[federal] negative on the State laws” was therefore 
essential.50  An absolute veto was essential, Madison argued in a letter to 
Jefferson after the Convention, because “[i]njustice may be effected by 
such an infinitude of legislative expedients, that . . . it can only be controuled 
by some provision which reaches all cases whatsoever.”51  Hamilton 
made the same argument in Federalist No. 80.52  It is implicit in 
Madison’s remarks that an unjust law evading the terms of a contracts 
provision in the Constitution would not be held void by the courts 
simply because it was unjust.  Madison proposed a prohibition on state 
embargoes because they were categorically “unjust,” as well as unnecessary 
 
 45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 528. 
 46. Id. 
 47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 451. 
 48. E.g., NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5, at 77, 145, 542. 
 49. Id. at 542. 
 50. Id. at 631.  Charles Pinckney spoke of “rights, privileges [and] properties” that 
would need to be protected by checks and balances in the frame of government, without 
any suggestion that these could be defended in a court of law.  Id. at 182. 
 51. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON at 212 (Robert A. Rutland et al. ed., 1977). 
 52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 535.  The 
premise that legislatures could enact laws circumventing enumerated prohibitions, 
because courts could only declare a law void if it clearly violated the Constitution, is also 
reflected in Hamilton’s discussion of liberty of the press: “Who can give it any definition 
which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion?”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 
(Alexander Hamilton), id., at 580. 
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and impolitic;53 implicitly, he did not anticipate that a court would 
declare such a law void because it was unjust.  Madison had used unjust 
and unconstitutional as separate headings in notes for a speech opposing 
paper money in 1786.54 
Further evidence that the Framers did not expect the new federal 
courts to invalidate state laws on grounds of violating natural rights is 
found in the Judiciary Act enacted by the Federalist majority in the First 
Congress.  This law permitted the Supreme Court to determine the “validity” 
of state statutes by writ of error only “on the ground of their being 
repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States . . . .”55  
This limitation of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction would have made no 
sense if the Federalists wanted natural justice or natural law to be used in 
deciding the validity of state statutes. 
III.  THE CASE LAW OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
References to judicial review at the Constitutional Convention, I have 
argued, reflected an expectation that the federal courts would enforce 
some extratextual rights in exercising judicial review over state laws, but 
not use injustice as a basis for declaring a statute void.56  The examples 
of enforceable extratextual rights referred to by Convention delegates 
were all rights having independent legal authority, such as those 
arguably contained in the English constitution, as Americans commonly 
conceived it.57  The federal courts of the early republic, leading scholars 
have argued, did not always confine themselves to enforcing the new 
written constitutions but also drew on so-called higher law—ahistorical 
principles of natural law or social compact.58  If accurate, this would 
mean that the federal courts exercised judicial review of a scope much 
wider than that contemplated by the Framers during the Philadelphia 
Convention. 
A strikingly different understanding of the legal relevance of natural 
law or social compact principles to judicial review was expressed by a 
federal judge in 1830.  Addressing the argument that a law should be 
 
 53. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5, at 543. 
 54. 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 51, at 158–59. 
 55. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 85; see id. at 86 (“[N]o other error 
shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal . . . .”). 
 56. See supra text accompanying notes 24–55. 
 57. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18, 24–38. 
 58. GERBER, supra note 15, at 124–25; HAINES, supra note 8, at 206–08; WRIGHT, 
supra note 1, at 293–97; SNOWISS, supra note 15, at 65–66; Edward S. Corwin, The 
Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247, 253 (1914); 
J.A.C. Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 56, 58–
63 (1931); Sherry, supra note 8, at 1168–76. 
HART.FINAL.DOC 10/15/2008  10:14:14 AM 
[VOL. 45:  823, 2008] Human Law, Higher Law, and Property Rights 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 833 
held void because it violated natural justice, he said that doing so would 
be unprecedented.  “No court has yet presumed to question a legislative 
act, on the ground of a difference with their notions of natural justice . . . .  It 
is the constitution that must be violated, and not any man’s opinions of 
right and wrong, or his principles of natural justice.”59  This was an 
accurate generalization, I contend, concerning federal courts reviewing 
state statutes that restricted property rights or economic liberty. 
Many such opinions that seem to rely on ahistorical principles of 
higher law—natural law or the social compact—in their reasoning, or 
seem to endorse in dictum the principle of using higher law to determine 
the validity of statutes, actually referred to such concepts in an ultimately 
historical, verifiable sense.  The authority of such rules or principles was 
derived from historically verifiable endorsement, not from higher law.  
In reviewing state legislation restricting property or economic rights, 
none of these judges ever asserted, even in dictum, that a right derived 
from the law of nature or from the social compact could render a statute 
void.60  Counsel earnestly pressed higher law arguments for overturning 
statutes, and higher law principles were often mentioned in dictum.  But 
the courts’ opinions on constitutional issues relied on higher law principles 
only when the positive fundamental law of the relevant jurisdiction 
incorporated those principles.61  What the early federal courts actually 
did is fairly close to what the Convention delegates had anticipated.  
These courts did not confine themselves to enforcing the written 
constitution of the jurisdiction, but they went outside the text only to 
draw on the purported rights of Englishmen or on principles purportedly 
shared in common by the American written constitutions as a group.  
 
 59. Livingston v. Moore, 15 F. Cas. 677, 683, 685 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830) (No. 8416), 
aff’d, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833). 
 60. Other scholars have challenged the aptness of the higher law interpretation of 
many of these cases, particularly those of the Supreme Court.  See ROBERT LOWRY 
CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888 (1985); 
MATTHEW J. FRANCK, AGAINST THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE 
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE (1996); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation: John 
Marshall, James Wilson, and the Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and 
Natural Law Jurisprudence in the New Federal Republic, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113 
(2003). 
 61. All of the first thirteen states had formally adopted positive fundamental law of 
some kind.  Only eleven, however, had adopted written constitutions.  Conventions in 
Connecticut and Rhode Island had adopted their existing royal charters as fundamental 
law.  See 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 289–90; see also supra text accompanying note 
30. 
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The early federal judges avoided relying on higher law principles in 
explaining their holdings. 
Judicial reliance on human law rather than higher law had practical 
importance; it meant that concretely pertinent historical evidence could 
impose limits on the creativity judges might use in inferring constitutional 
principles.62  And the distinction between reasoning from historical 
evidence and reasoning from ahistorical concepts is of historiographical 
importance because it tends to contradict the claim made by many 
scholars that the property rights jurisprudence of the early federal courts 
helped pave the way for the laissez-faire constitutionalism of the later 
nineteenth century.63 
A.  Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance (1795) 
Justice Patterson’s circuit court opinion in Van Horne’s Lessee v. 
Dorrance states that “the right of acquiring and possessing property, and 
having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights 
of man” and that obtaining security for property “was one of the objects, 
that induced [men] to unite in society.”64  It has been classified as an 
instance of natural law reasoning.65  The beginning and ending of the 
passage in which this language occurs, however, show that Patterson is 
not citing natural law in its own right as authority for his decision.  
Patterson derives his propositions of natural law from the Pennsylvania 
Declaration of Rights adopted as part of the state constitution in 1776: 
“I.  That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain 
natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are . . . acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property . . . .  VIII.  That every member of 
 
 62. E.g., Commonwealth v. Lewis, 6 Binn. 266, 278 (Pa. 1814). 
 63. CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789–1835, at 417–18, 641 (1973); WRIGHT, supra note 1, 
at 293; Corwin, supra note 58, at 253–54; James W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and 
Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1061 (2000); Grant, 
supra note 58, at 58. 
 64. Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795). 
 65. E.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 63 (3d ed. 2008); GERBER, supra note 
15, at 68, 117–19; CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 
89 (1930); WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 293; Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in 
Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement 
of “Unwritten” Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421, 452 (1990); cf. SNOWISS, supra 
note 15, at 68 (asserting that in Van Horne’s Lessee natural law principles are given 
“disproportionate attention” over the constitutional text). 
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society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and 
property . . . .”66  After Patterson reads these provisions to the jury, he says: 
From these passages it is evident; that the right of acquiring and possessing 
property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable 
rights of man. . . .  The preservation of property then is a primary object of the 
social compact, and, by the last Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a 
fundamental law.67 
Patterson refers to natural rights and the social compact, but not as 
independently authoritative.  It is only because the Pennsylvania 
constitution has “made” them “fundamental law” in that state that these 
objects of the social compact are legally relevant. 
B.  Calder v. Bull (1798) 
Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull refers to the “purposes for 
which men enter into society” and “the great first principles of the social 
compact,”68 and has been classified as an example of higher law reasoning.69  
But Chase’s argument that legislative power is subject to implied limits 
ultimately relies on evidence that is historical in character, not on a 
hypothetical social compact.  The social compacts Chase relies on are 
the recently adopted state and federal constitutions: “The people of the 
United States erected their Constitutions, or forms of government, to 
establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings 
of liberty, and to protect their persons and property from violence.”70  
Chase uses the asserted commonality of “certain vital principles in our 
free Republican governments”71 because Connecticut lacked a written 
 
 66. 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE 
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3082–83 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
 67. Van Horne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added). 
 68. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). 
 69. ELY, supra note 65, at 63; GERBER, supra note 15, at 118–19; WRIGHT, supra 
note 1, at 294; Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil 
War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 376 (1911); Walter F. Dodd, Extra-Constitutional 
Limitations Upon Legislative Power, 40 YALE L.J. 1188, 1193 (1930); Grant, supra note 
58, at 58–59; Charles Grove Haines, The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial 
Decisions, 25 YALE L.J. 617, 628 (1916); Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law 
Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 49, 78 (1992); Michael, supra 
note 65, at 452; Sherry, supra note 8, at 1172–73. 
 70. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388. 
 71. Id. 
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revolutionary constitution comparable to those of other states.72  Chase’s 
assertion that legislatures were subject to implied limitations refers not 
to every legislature, as in the writings of “speculative jurists,”73 but to a 
“Federal, or State Legislature.”74  Chase thus claims to derive his 
conclusions from historical evidence, not the ipse dixit of higher law 
reasoning.  Chase asserts that an American legislature would be exceeding 
its authority if it authorized “manifest injustice by positive law.”75  But 
this claim does not depend on natural law; it parallels the argument 
Federalist advocates had made so often during the ratification process: 
that existing extratextual rights would remain available to citizens even 
if the Constitution lacked a bill of rights.76  Chase’s claim that the recent 
American constitutions had been formed to achieve “security” for 
“personal liberty” and “private property” is historical in character.77 
Chase’s argument does not depend on inferring the terms of an 
ahistorical agreement from principles of natural justice.  Instead he invokes 
a purportedly common knowledge among his readers, based on their shared 
historical personal experience.78  His characterization of legislative power is 
 
 72. Connecticut declared its independence by an act of the legislature stating that 
the colony charter of 1662 would “remain the Civil Constitution of this State.”  1 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 289–90.  The Act contained a very brief recital of rights, 
consisting essentially of due process.  Id. at 290.  Connecticut’s judiciary had already 
twice held an act of the legislature invalid, without identifying a pertinent source of 
fundamental law.  See Treanor, supra note 7, at 487–89.  The Connecticut courts may 
have been tacitly relying on Connecticut’s royal charter of 1662, which granted colonists 
“all Liberties and Immunities of free and natural Subjects within any the Dominions of 
Us, Our Heirs or Successors, to all Intents, Constructions and Purposes whatsoever, as if 
they and every of them were born within the realm of England,” and authorized the 
assembly to make “all manner of wholesome, and reasonable Laws, Statutes, Ordinances, 
Directions, and Instructions, not Contrary to the Laws of this Realm of England.”  5 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 66, at 533; see Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 
U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 656–57 (1829). 
 73. “It is true, that some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against 
natural justice must, in itself, be void . . . .”  Calder, 3 U.S. at 398 (Iredell, J.).  Justice 
Iredell denies that courts have the power to declare a statute “void, merely because it is, 
in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice,” and observes that “ideas 
of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and purest men have 
differed upon the subject . . . .”  Id. at 399.  Iredell’s strictures have been read as directed 
towards Chase, but this may not have been the case.  Justice Iredell had already made the 
same argument at greater length in Minge v. Gilmour, 17 F. Cas. 440, 444 (C.C.D.N.C. 
1798) (No. 9631).  Chase was a judge, not a jurist, and his opinion in Calder does not 
rely on any ahistorical principles of natural justice. 
 74. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 36–37. 
 77. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388. 
 78. In contrast, Chase uses an explicitly speculative tone in referring to the origins 
and status of property rights: 
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framed specifically for American legislatures rather than legislatures 
everywhere. 
The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they may declare new 
crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases; they 
may command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change 
innocence into guilt; or punish innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an 
antecedent lawful private contract; or the right of private property.  To maintain 
that our Federal, or State, Legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been 
expressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether 
inadmissible in our free republican governments.79 
Chase appeals here to empirical evidence, his readers’ supposed familiarity 
with the principles of “our free republican governments,” not to a higher 
law derived from an abstract, ahistorical social compact. 
Finally, although Chase seems to be asserting that the legislature’s 
power is subject to substantive written limitations, his reasoning ultimately 
takes the form of an interpretive presumption: “It is against all reason 
and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such powers; and, 
therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.”80  Similarly, 
Chase says it is “not to be presumed, that the federal or state legislatures 
will pass laws to deprive citizens of rights vested in them by existing 
laws; unless for the benefit of the whole community; and on making full 
satisfaction.”81  Plainly, principles that a society might choose whether 
or not to adopt are not principles of higher law. 
C.  Fletcher v. Peck (1810) 
In Fletcher v. Peck, the Yazoo Land Case, the Court held that a state 
was barred from annulling its own grant, even if procured by fraud, of 
land now held by a third party who had purchased the land for value 
with no notice of the fraud.82  Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion has been 
understood as relying on higher law or social compact reasoning as at 
 
It seems to me, that the right of property, in its origin, could only arise from 
compact express, or implied, and I think it the better opinion, that the right, as 
well as the mode, or manner, of acquiring property, and of alienating or 
transferring, inheriting, or transmitting it, is conferred by society; is regulated 
by civil institutions, and is always subject to the rules prescribed by positive 
law. 
Id. at 394 (first and fourth emphases added). 
 79. Id. at 388–89. 
 80. Id. at 388. 
 81. Id. at 394. 
 82. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810). 
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least an alternative basis for the holding.83  Some of Marshall’s remarks 
do seem to rely on higher law: 
[T]here are certain great principles of justice, whose authority is universally 
acknowledged, that ought not to be entirely disregarded.  
 . . . . 
   It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government does 
not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and, if any be prescribed, 
where are they to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly 
acquired, may be seized without compensation[?] 
   . . . [T]he state of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which 
are common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the 
constitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the 
plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally 
impaired and rendered null and void.84 
But the “great principles of justice, whose authority is universally 
acknowledged”85 come from the English legal tradition, as it was 
commonly conceived by contemporary American writers, rather than 
from natural law or natural rights. 
When Marshall questions whether the State of Georgia can rightfully 
“claim to itself the power of judging in its own case,”86 he is alluding to 
one of Chief Justice Coke’s own examples of a statute “against common 
right and reason” that “the common law adjudges . . . as to that point void.”87  
He does not insist on this, though, going on to argue that if Georgia 
could rescind a conveyance by statute rather than by litigation—
 
 83. GERBER, supra note 15, at 120; HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT, 
supra note 63, at 326; SNOWISS, supra note 15, at 126; Corwin, supra note 58, at 253; 
Grant, supra note 58, at 59–60; Massey, supra note 69, at 77–78; Michael, supra note 
65, at 474; William Wiecek, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought: Preface to 
the Modern Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND AMERICAN CULTURE: WRITING THE 
NEW CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 64, 70 (Sandra F. VanBurkleo et al. eds., 2002); 
Wilmarth, supra note 60, at 126. 
 84. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 133, 135, 139 (emphasis added). 
 85. Id. at 133. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 653 (K.B. 1610); see id. at 654 (“[I]f 
any Act of Parliament gives to any to hold . . . pleas arising before him within his manor 
of D., yet he shall hold no plea, to which he himself is a party . . . .”).  Marshall’s 
assertions that a contrary result would make all land titles “insecure” and seriously 
obstruct “the intercourse between man and man,” and that the power exercised by the 
Georgia legislature would “devest any other individual of his lands, if it shall be the will 
of the legislature so to exert it,” Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 133–34, follow Coke’s method of 
demonstrating that a statute is against common reason: asserting that its principle would 
lead to absurd results in other cases.  See Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 654 (arguing 
that if a certain statute is upheld, then logically “every common seal shall be defeated 
upon a simple surmise, which cannot be tried”). 
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“performing a duty usually assigned to a court”88—it would nonetheless 
be “equitable,”—rescission being an equitable remedy—and that “its 
decision should be regulated by those rules which would have regulated 
the decision of a judicial tribunal.”89  Here again Marshall draws on 
English legal tradition rather than higher law: a “court of chancery . . . 
would have been bound, by its own rules, and by the clearest principles 
of equity, to leave unmolested those who were purchasers, without 
notice, for a valuable consideration.”90  What makes this conclusion 
authoritative for an American court, in Marshall’s view, is that it follows 
“rules of property . . . common to all the citizens of the United States” 
and “principles of equity which are acknowledged in all our courts.”91  
These are rules and principles, in other words, “whose authority is 
universally acknowledged” throughout the United States.92  Marshall 
speculates, but does not assert, that “the nature of society and of 
government” prescribes “some limits to the legislative power,” but the 
implied limitation he suggests is, again, conventional in English and 
American fundamental law: that “the property of an individual, fairly 
and honestly acquired,” may not be “seized without compensation.”93  
 
 88. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 133.  In Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 398, 397–401 
(1798), the Supreme Court had held that the Connecticut assembly did not overstep its 
authority by ordering a new trial in a civil case, overruling an earlier court ruling, 
because the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution applies solely to criminal and not 
civil cases.  A court proceeding was the “mode” which “the common sentiment, as well 
as common usage of mankind, points out” for seeking to “set aside a conveyance 
obtained by fraud.”  Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 133. 
 89. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 133. 
 90. Id. at 134. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 133. 
 93. Id. at 135.  See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND *139: 
If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private 
person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; . . . [but] the 
public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of 
every individual's private rights . . . . [T]he legislature alone can . . . interpose, 
and compel the individual to acquiesce . . . [n]ot by absolutely stripping the 
subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full 
indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. 
Id. 
By 1810 an express compensation requirement was contained in several state 
constitutions as well as in the Federal Bill of Rights, and the principle of compensation 
was conventional.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X; OHIO CONST. 
art. VIII, § 4; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 10; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. II; James W. Ely, Jr., “That 
due satisfaction may be made:” the Fifth Amendment and the Origins of the 
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Marshall’s reasoning, moreover, would be essential to the case only 
“were Georgia a single sovereign power.”94  But Georgia is part of the 
“American union,” with its “constitution the supremacy of which all 
acknowledge, and which imposes limits to the legislatures of the several 
states, which none claim a right to pass.”95 
Marshall then proceeds to interpret the Contracts Clause, reinforcing 
“the natural meaning of words”96 with an account of the views of the 
Framers and the understanding of the ratifiers: 
   If, under a fair construction of the constitution, grants are comprehended under the 
term contracts, is a grant from the state excluded from the operation of the 
provision? . . . 
   The words themselves contain no such distinction.  They are general, and are 
applicable to contracts of every description.  If contracts made with the state are 
to be exempted from their operation, the exception must arise from the character 
of the contracting party, not from the words which are employed. 
   Whatever respect might have been felt for the state sovereignties, it is not to 
be disguised that the framers of the Constitution viewed with some apprehension, 
the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment; and that 
the people of the United States, in adopting that instrument, have manifested a 
determination to shield themselves and their property from the effects of those 
sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed.  The restrictions on the 
legislative power of the states are obviously founded in this sentiment . . . .97 
What has been regarded as higher law reasoning appears again in 
Marshall’s concluding statement: 
   It is, then, the unanimous opinion of the court that, in this case, the estate 
having passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, 
without notice, the state of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles 
which are common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the 
constitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the 
plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally 
impaired and rendered null and void.98 
These remarks do not imply higher law reasoning on Marshall’s part.  
The “general principles which are common to our free institutions” are 
those recited or implied in the American constitutions,99 not the principles 
of an imagined, ahistorical social compact.  And his reference to “general 
principles which are common to our free institutions” is explicitly stated 
 
Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1, 15–16, 18 (1992). 
 94. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 136. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 138. 
 97. Id. at 137–38 (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. at 139 (emphasis added). 
 99. Id.  This recalls Justice Chase’s reasoning in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
386, 388 (1798).  See supra text accompanying notes 68–81. 
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in the alternative in order to comprehend Justice Johnson’s reasoning.  
Marshall, characteristically, wants to characterize the Court’s position as 
unanimous, but Justice Johnson explicitly denies that the Contracts 
Clause justifies overturning the Georgia statute, and instead invokes “the 
reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws even on 
the deity.”100  Marshall does not endorse Johnson’s rationale here.  He 
merely describes it, in the alternative, as part of a unanimous result. 
Justice Johnson’s use of the phrase “general principle, the reason and 
nature of things” certainly sounds like higher law, especially since it appears 
in the same sentence as “the deity.”101  But the reasoning Johnson uses to 
explain himself suggests instead that his thinking was entirely earthbound.  
The “things” whose “nature” lead Johnson to deem the Georgia law 
invalid are the substance of the transaction and dispute viewed in 
conventional legal and political terms, not eternal principles of natural 
justice.102  Johnson deals in principles of government, not natural rights, 
when he insists on the distinction between a sovereign’s “right of 
jurisdiction” and its “right of soil.”103  Of the same character is Johnson’s 
assertion that a sovereign’s possessions “may be parted with in every 
respect similarly to those of the individuals who compose the community” 
because its possessions are “entirely accidental” and “in no [way] necessary 
to its political existence.”104  His conclusion that property conveyed by 
the public becomes thereby “vested” in the recipient tracks a concept of 
the common law.105  Johnson’s premise that the acts of the “supreme 
power” “must be considered pure for the same reason that all sovereign 
acts must be considered just; because there is no power that can declare 
them otherwise” is the antithesis of higher law reasoning.106  Johnson’s 
effort to demonstrate the “absurdity” of the opposing argument is a 
familiar device in common law reasoning.107  On the question of whether 
Georgia had held the lands in question in fee simple, despite the rights of 
Indian tribes, Johnson reasons from “technical principles.”108  His “just 
 
 100. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 143. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Similarly, Marshall says that the issue in Fletcher is “in its nature, a question 
of title.”  Id. at 133. 
 103. Id. at 143. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 144. 
 107. Id.; see, e.g., Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 654 (K.B. 1610). 
 108. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 146. 
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view of the State of the Indian Nations” is derived from the evidence of 
treaties, laws, and land purchases, and not from natural law principles.109  
And the nature of Georgia’s title follows from “our law,” which “will 
not admit” the idea of a fee simple estate “being limited after a fee-
simple.”110  Thus, Johnson’s “general principle” of “the reason and nature 
of things” makes essentially the same kind of appeal to conventional 
legal reasoning as Marshall’s “great principles of justice, whose 
authority is universally acknowledged.”111 
D.  Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler (1814)112 
A New Hampshire statute required a landowner suing to recover 
possession of real property to pay compensation for the value of 
improvements made by a tenant who had peacefully occupied the 
premises for more than six years with color of title.113  A landowner 
subject to this statute challenged it on the ground that it was “repugnant 
to natural justice,” besides violating the federal and state constitutions.114  
In the course of holding the statute unconstitutional under the New 
Hampshire constitution, Justice Story says that applying a statute to 
“past cases” is “against natural justice.”115  But this statement does not 
mean that Story endorses the landowner’s claim that the statute was void.  
Rather, he construes a provision in the state constitution prohibiting 
“[r]etrospective laws” as “highly injurious, oppressive and unjust”;116 the 
issue as he poses it is whether the law before him is a retrospective law 
within the meaning of the state constitution.117  Notably, Story refrains 
from reading the state constitution’s retrospectivity clause on its face as 
banning all retrospective laws, and from applying the Federal Contracts 
Clause because the law in question impaired “vested rights.”118  Story 
cites but does not endorse Chancellor Kent’s categorical condemnation 
 
 109. Id. at 146–47. 
 110. Id. at 147. 
 111. Id. at 133. 
 112. 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156). 
 113. Id. at 767–68. 
 114. Id. at 766. 
 115. Id. at 768. 
 116. N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XXIII, in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 66, at 2456. 
 117. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 767. 
 118. Id.; cf. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (“[C]onveyances 
have vested legal estates, and . . . that they originally vested is a fact, and cannot cease to 
be a fact.”).  “[T]he people of the United States,” in ratifying the Constitution, “have 
manifested a determination to shield themselves and their property” from arbitrary state 
legislation.  Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 138. 
HART.FINAL.DOC 10/15/2008  10:14:14 AM 
[VOL. 45:  823, 2008] Human Law, Higher Law, and Property Rights 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 843 
of retrospective laws,119 saying only that “in a fit case” he would “go a 
great way” with Kent’s analysis.120 
E.  Terrett v. Taylor (1815) 
A Virginia statute of 1801 asserted public ownership of lands 
belonging to the Episcopal Church, an established church up until 1776.  
In Terrett v. Taylor, a case coming from the part of the District of 
Columbia ceded to the federal government by Virginia, the Supreme 
Court held that the statute was void as an attempt to: 
repeal statutes creating private corporations, or confirming to them property 
already acquired under the faith of previous laws, and by such repeal . . . vest 
the property of such corporations exclusively in the state, or dispose of the same 
to such purposes as they may please, without the consent or default of the 
corporators . . . .121 
 
 119. See Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 505–06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811): 
An ex post facto law, in the strict technical sense of this term, is usually 
understood to apply to criminal cases, and this is its meaning, when used in the 
Constitution of the United States; yet laws impairing previously acquired civil 
rights are . . . equally to be condemned.  We have seen that the cases in the 
English and in the civil law apply to such rights; and we shall find, upon 
further examination, that there is no distinction in principle, nor any 
recognized in practice, between a law punishing a person criminally, for a past 
innocent act, or punishing him civilly by devesting him of a lawfully acquired 
right.  The distinction exists only in the degree of the oppression . . . . 
Id.  See also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 303–04 (1827) (Thompson, J., 
concurring): 
No State Court would, I presume, sanction and enforce an ex post facto law; if 
no such prohibition was contained in the constitution of the United States; so, 
neither would retrospective laws, taking away vested rights, be enforced.  Such 
laws are repugnant to those fundamental principles, upon which every just 
system of laws is founded.  It is an elementary principle adopted and 
sanctioned by the Courts of justice in this country, and in Great Britain, 
whenever such laws have come under consideration, and yet retrospective laws 
are clearly within this prohibition. 
Id.  See also id. at 304–05: 
[B]ills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of 
contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every 
principle of sound legislation.  The two former are expressly prohibited by the 
declarations prefixed to some of the State constitutions, and all of them are 
prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. 
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 281). 
 120. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 767. 
 121. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815). 
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Justice Story’s opinion for the Court refers to “the common sense of 
mankind and the maxims of eternal justice,” “principles of civil right,” 
“the principles of natural justice,” and “the fundamental laws of every 
free government,”122 among other extra-constitutional principles, and is 
widely cited as a classic instance of higher law reasoning.123 
The conceptual context of the quoted remarks, however, is the 
prerevolutionary American Whig understanding of an English constitution 
that imposed substantive limits on the power of Parliament.  Chief 
Justice Coke’s famous assertion in Bonham’s Case that “when an Act of 
Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant . . . the 
common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void,”124 had 
been taken as axiomatic by many Americans since before the Revolution.125  
When Story asserts that the churches’ property was “indefeasibly vested” in 
their legal agents,126 he is not asserting a natural rights principle that 
vested rights can never be impaired, or that no vested rights are 
defeasible.  His point is that the title to this particular property is 
indefeasible because the rules of English common law on this point are 
part of Virginia’s fundamental law, and none of the ways one might lose 
vested rights under the English common law applied in this case.  The 
fact that the property had been “generally purchased by the parishioners, 
or acquired by the benefactions of pious donors,” rather than “originally 
granted by the state or the king,”127 was significant because this put the 
property beyond the reach of the English common law principle that 
grants might be resumed by a grantor for breach or nonperformance of 
an implied condition.128  The English common law also authorized forfeiture 
of vested property to the Crown for certain kinds of offenses.129  But this 
exception to the common law’s protection of vested property was also 
foreclosed: the property “was not forfeited; for the churches had 
committed no offence.”130 
When Story says that “dissolution of the regal government” did not 
destroy “the right to possess or enjoy this property,” or dissolve “civil 
 
 122. Id. at 50–52. 
 123. SNOWISS, supra note 15, at 136; WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 296–97; Dodd, 
supra note 69, at 1193 & n.24; Ely, Marshall Court, supra note 63, at 1049–50; Grant, 
supra note 58, at 60–61; Haines, The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial 
Decisions, supra note 69, at 640; Sherry, supra note 8, at 1175. 
 124. 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610). 
 125. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
 126. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 49. 
 127. Id. 
 128. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *152–53. 
 129. Id. at 267–68. 
 130. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 50. 
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rights” or abolish “the common law,”131 he paraphrases provisions of the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights.132  Story invokes “a principle of the common 
law that the division of an empire creates no forfeiture of previously 
vested rights of property,” and remarks that this principle “is equally 
consonant with the common sense of mankind and the maxims of eternal 
justice.”133  But associating a rule of positive law with natural justice 
was a conventional way of commending the positive law;134  Story does 
not say “the maxims of eternal justice” have independent legal force.  
He quickly sidesteps the foregoing reasoning anyway: “admitting that, 
by the revolution, the church lands devolved on the state, the statute of 
1776, ch. 2, operated as a new grant and confirmation thereof to the use 
of the church.”135 
Assuming arguendo that the churches derived their property from the 
statute of 1776, Story next considers whether the state could revoke this 
grant.  Because Story has already established that under English common 
law there is no basis for resuming the grant based on breach of implied 
condition or on forfeiture for nonperformance of implied condition, it 
follows that the only way the churches could lose their property would 
be if a legislative grant were “revocable in its own nature, and held only 
durante bene placito.”136  Story’s assertion that such a premise would be 
“utterly inconsistent with a great and fundamental principle of a 
republican government, the right of the citizens to the free enjoyment of 
their property legally acquired,” again reflects premises stated in the 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  See the VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 1 (1776): 
That all men . . . have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a 
state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; 
namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and 
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 
Id.; see also id. § 8 (“[T]hat no man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the 
land or the judgment of his peers.”); id. § 11 (“That in controversies respecting property, 
and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other, 
and ought to be held sacred.”); 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 66, at 
3813–14. 
 133. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 50. 
 134. E.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
*121–23; see also Hamburger, supra note 19, at 18; REID, supra note 18, at 90–92. 
 135. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 50. 
 136. Id. 
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Virginia Declaration of Rights, as well as in other states’ constitutions137 
and in prior Supreme Court opinions.138 
Story next turns to the status of the churches as corporations, 
established by an Act of 1784 that had been later repealed.  The common 
law was “a tacit condition annexed to the creation of every such 
corporation;” Story asks whether the circumstances fit any of the ways a 
private corporation could “loose its franchises” under the common 
law.139  A common law proceeding of quo warranto might be used in 
cases of “a misuser or a nonuser” of a private corporation’s privileges, 
but no such proceeding had been instituted here, nor had the legislature 
alleged misuser or nonuser.140  Responding to Virginia’s claim that the 
Act of 1784 violated its own constitution and bill of rights, Story 
concedes that “a change of government” would permit terminating 
whatever “exclusive” corporate privileges were “inconsistent with the 
new government.”141  But it is dispositive here, Story argues, that the 
contrary understanding of the state constitution had been acted on by 
Virginia’s “former legislatures from the earliest existence of the 
constitution itself,” in statutes “promulgated or acquiesced in by a great 
majority, if not the whole, of the very framers of the constitution.”142  
Summarizing this line of common law analysis, Story denies that “the 
legislature can repeal statutes creating private corporations, or confirm[] 
to them property already acquired under the faith of previous laws” in 
the absence of a common law basis for repealing a legislative charter or 
grant.143 
Story concludes his constitutional analysis grandly: “[W]e think ourselves 
standing upon the principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental 
 
 137. Id. at 50–51; see VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 1 (1776) (“That all men 
. . . have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they 
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life 
and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property . . . .”); 7 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 66, at 3813. 
 138. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388–89 (1798) (“The Legislature . . . 
cannot . . . violate . . . the right of private property.  To maintain that our federal, or state 
legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been expressly restrained; would, in 
my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free republican 
governments.”); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (“[W]here are 
[inherent limits to legislative power] to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly 
and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation[?]”). 
 139. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 51; see Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292, 
333 (1815) (Story, J.) (“[W]e take it to be a clear principle that the common law in force 
at the emigration of our ancestors is deemed the birth right of the colonies unless so far 
as it is inapplicable to their situation, or repugnant to their other rights and privileges.”). 
 140. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 51. 
 141. Id. at 51–52. 
 142. Id. at 51. 
 143. Id. at 52. 
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laws of every free government, upon the spirit and the letter of the 
constitution of the United States, and upon the decisions of most 
respectable judicial tribunals, in resisting such a doctrine.”144  But given 
that Story’s argument up to this point consists of a methodical analysis 
of common law principles supposedly adopted by Virginia as part of its 
fundamental law, it is unlikely that Story means to rest his holding partly 
on natural justice, mentioned now for the first time without explanation 
or elaboration.145  The usual reason for asserting that some other legal 
tradition would reach the same result as the common law was to emphasize 
the soundness of the common law position, not to attribute independent 
authority to the other tradition.146  Story’s sweeping reference to other 
kinds of law as supporting his decision should be seen as a response to 
anticipated criticism of the opinion for treating common law rules as 
fundamental law.147 
F.  Johnson v. McIntosh (1823) 
In Johnson v. McIntosh, determining the validity of title conveyed by 
Indian tribes, Chief Justice Marshall makes many references suggestive 
of higher law reasoning.148  Marshall says deciding the case requires 
examining “those principles of abstract justice, which the Creator of all 
things has impressed on the mind of his creature man, and which are 
admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the rights of civilized nations,” as 
well as principles of American law.149  He refers to “the rights of the 
original inhabitants,” “the rightful occupants of the soil,” “natural right,” 
and “universal law,” distances himself from the “pompous claims” of 
European nations, and disclaims any intention of defending “those 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Here, the fundamental laws of every free government refers to the state 
constitutions in general.  See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–88 (1798); see 
also Jones v. Shore’s Ex’r, 14 U.S. 462, 471 (1816) (Story, J.) (asserting that “the words 
of a statute ought to be very clear” to prevail over an otherwise applicable “maxim of 
natural justice”). 
 146. E.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
*419; see R.H. Helmholz, Use of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary American 
Jurisprudence, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1649, 1676–82 (1992). 
 147. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 578 
(asserting that the common law is “liable to repeal by the ordinary legislative power” and 
has “no constitutional sanction” under the New York constitution). 
 148. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); see WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 295. 
 149. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 572. 
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principles which Europeans have applied to Indian title.”150  But the only 
abstract principles Marshall even considers applying are those that have 
been accepted and consistently acted on by European and American 
governments; he dismisses other principles of the natural law treatise 
tradition as “private and speculative opinions of individuals.”151  And 
none of the natural law principles Marshall mentions that would support 
the natives’ title to their own lands are given any effect where they 
conflict with “the law of the nation in which they lie;” principles “which 
our own government has adopted in the particular case, and given us as 
the rule for our decision.”152 
The discovery doctrine must be accepted by American courts as 
authoritative, Marshall argues, because abundant historical evidence 
shows it to be conventional among relevant nations—a principle 
“recognised by all European governments, from the first settlement of 
America.”153  Most importantly, the discovery doctrine is one to which 
the United States had “unequivocally acceded,” which the United States 
had “exercised uniformly over territory in possession of the Indians.”154  
The discovery doctrine was recognized by “[a]ll our institutions,” and 
had never been “questioned in our Courts.”155  The discovery doctrine 
had been so continuously asserted and so widely acted on, Marshall 
argues, that American courts cannot reconsider it. 
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited 
country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first 
instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held 
under it; if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it 
becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.156 
Here it becomes apparent that even the rules of international law 
established among European powers have no independent legal authority 
 
 150. Id. at 574, 589–91, 595; see also id. at 573 (“The potentates of the old world 
found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the 
inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange 
for unlimited independence.”).  Marshall returned to this theme in Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832). 
 151. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 588; see The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 115 
(1825) (arguing that the slave trade “could not be considered as contrary to the law of 
nations,” because it “was authorized and protected by the laws of all commercial 
nations”). 
 152. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 572; see also Meade v. Deputy Marshal, 16 F. Cas. 1291, 
1293 (C.C.D. Va. 1815) (No. 9372) (Marshall, J.) (“It is a principle of natural justice, 
which courts are never at liberty to dispense with, unless under the mandate of positive 
law, that no person shall be condemned . . . without an opportunity of being heard.”) 
 153. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 592. 
 154. Id. at 587–88. 
 155. Id. at 588. 
 156. Id. at 591. 
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in Marshall’s analysis.  Even if the discovery doctrine and its corollary 
principles were “opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized 
nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the country 
has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two 
people, it . . . certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice.”157 
G.  Corfield v. Coryell (1823) 
Enforcing a New Jersey statue that reserved to state residents the right 
of dredging for oysters in territorial waters, state officials seized a boat 
owned by a non-resident.158  The boat’s owner challenged the constitutionality 
of this law under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, among other 
grounds.159  Circuit Justice Washington’s famous definition of privileges 
and immunities uses many phrases evocative of the Declaration of 
Independence and other higher law texts: 
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and 
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to 
the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed 
by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of 
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.  What these fundamental 
principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate.  
They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: 
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to 
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness 
and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly 
prescribe for the general good of the whole.  The right of a citizen of one state 
to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, 
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas 
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to 
take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption 
from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; 
may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of 
citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges 
deemed to be fundamental . . . .160 
The entire passage is anchored to verifiable positive law, however, by 
the qualifying phrase “which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the 
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of 
their becoming free.”161  Thus Washington does not attribute independent 
 
 157. Id. at 591–92 (emphasis added). 
 158. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 547–48 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
 159. Id. at 550. 
 160. Id. at 551–52; see WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 294 n.1. 
 161. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551 (emphasis added). 
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legal authority to natural rights principles.162  A natural right that has not 
been continuously enjoyed since 1776 in all thirteen states is not among 
the privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution, according to 
his formulation.  This empirical anchor explains how Washington can 
say that enumerating these privileges, although “tedious,” would not be 
“difficult.”163  In contrast, a longstanding premise of natural rights discourse 
was the impossibility of enumerating all the natural rights.164 
H.  Wilkinson v. Leland (1829) 
Justice Story’s opinion for the Court in Wilkinson v. Leland declares 
“[t]hat government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights 
of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body, 
without any restraint,” and that “[t]he fundamental maxims of a free 
government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private 
property should be held sacred.”165  Story’s opinion is widely regarded 
as an example of higher law reasoning,166 but his argument deals in 
 
 162. See also United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S (2 Cranch) 358, 400 (1805) (“[I]f the 
literal expressions of the law would lead to absurd, unjustified, inconvenient consequences, 
such a construction should be given as to avoid such consequences, if, from the whole 
purview of the law, and giving effect to the words used, it may fairly be done.”); Beach 
v. Woodhull, 2 F. Cas. 1104, 1105 (C.C.D.N.J 1803) (No. 1154) (“The law is clearly 
retrospective and unjust in its operation, but it is not for this court to correct it, or to 
declare it a nullity.  It is not repugnant to the constitution.”). 
 163. Corfield, 6 F. Cas at 551.  Similarly, George Mason had said in the Federal 
Convention that “with the aid of the State declarations [of rights] a [federal] bill might be 
prepared in a few hours.”  NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5, at 630. 
 164. James Wilson had made this point in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: 
I consider there are very few who understand the whole of these rights.  All the 
political writers, from Grotius and Puffendorf down to Vattel, have treated on 
this subject; but in no one of those books, nor in the aggregate of them all, can 
you find a complete enumeration of rights appertaining to the people as men 
and citizens. . . . Enumerate all the rights of men!  I am sure, sir, that no 
gentlemen in the late Convention would have attempted such a thing. 
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 470 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., 1976).  In the North Carolina ratifying convention, on July 28, 1788, Samuel 
Spencer asked for “a bill of rights, to secure those unalienable rights, which are called by 
some respectable writers the residuum of human rights, which are never to be given up” 
under any government.  James Iredell responded, “No man, let his ingenuity be what it 
will, could enumerate all the individual rights not relinquished by the Constitution. . . . 
Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will immediately 
mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it.”  4 THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 138, 
149, 167 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836); see also Philip A. Hamburger, Natural 
Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 942 (1993) 
(“Commentators had long observed that natural law was so general and so imprecise that 
it invited a variety of conflicting opinions about its requirements.”). 
 165. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829). 
 166. See WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 296–97; Dodd, supra note 69, at 1193; Ely, 
supra note 63, at 1051; Gerber, supra note 15, at 243; Grant, supra note 58, at 63; 
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historical inference—“the true extent of the power . . . granted” by the 
people of Rhode Island to their legislature—rather than higher law.167 
After a probate proceeding in New Hampshire, the executrix had 
contracted to sell the decedent’s property in Rhode Island without 
undertaking any probate proceedings there.  Attempting to cure this 
irregularity, the executrix then obtained from the Rhode Island legislature a 
private act that ratified the transaction.  The constitutionality of the private 
act was challenged in the course of an action of ejectment.168  But Rhode 
Island, like Connecticut at the time of Calder v. Bull, lacked a written 
constitution.169  Instead, the “form of government” that a revolutionary 
convention established at the time of the Revolution was based on the 
colonial charter of 1663, which was therefore “now a fundamental law.”170  
The charter’s definition of the legislature’s powers was itself vague, however, 
providing merely that laws should “be not contrary to and repugnant 
unto, but as near as may be agreeable to the laws, &c. of England, 
considering the nature and constitution of the place and people there.”171 
Story treats the question of the legislature’s power as a matter for 
historical inference, not the application of higher law.  In determining 
whether “the people of Rhode Island have ever delegated to their 
legislature the power to divest the vested rights of property, and transfer 
them without the assent of the parties,” Story posits a series of historical 
presumptions derived from historical circumstances, to be acted on in 
the absence of contrary evidence:172 
In a government professing to regard the great rights of personal liberty and of 
property, and which is required to legislate in subordination to the general laws of 
England, it would not lightly be presumed that the great principles of Magna 
Charta were to be disregarded, or that the estates of its subjects were liable to be 
taken away without trial, without notice, and without offence.173 
 
Charles Grove Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation in the United States and the 
Doctrines of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations on Legislatures, 2 TEX. L. REV. 
257, 285 & n.65 (1924). 
 167. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 657. 
 168. Id. at 654–55. 
 169. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392–93 (1798); 1 THORPE, supra note 30, 
at 129; see supra text accompanying notes 30–31. 
 170. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 656.  Story speaks of whether the statute is 
“constitutional” even though Rhode Island lacked a written constitution at this time.  Id. 
 171. Id. at 657.  The words replaced by “&c.” are “of this our realme.”  See 6 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 66, at 3215. 
 172. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 658. 
 173. Id. at 657.  This is consistent with Story’s view of the relevance of natural 
HART.FINAL.DOC 10/15/2008  10:14:14 AM 
 
852 
And even if the royal charter could be shown to have granted the 
colonial assembly such extraordinary authority, it could “scarcely be 
imagined” that the revolutionary process in Rhode Island “could have 
left the people of that state subjected to its uncontrolled and arbitrary 
exercise.”174 
Story’s assertion that the “fundamental maxims of a free government 
seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property 
should be held sacred”175 does not mean the “fundamental maxims of a 
free government” have an independent authority that courts must enforce.  
Rather, Story argues that these are implicit terms of the “general grant of 
. . . authority” from the people during Rhode Island’s “great event”176—
the Revolution—that established the powers of Rhode Island’s assembly.  
To discern the unarticulated intentions of Rhode Island’s body politic at 
that time, Story infers a commonality of basic governmental principles 
among the people of the thirteen states in 1776.  If the people of Rhode 
Island had meant to adopt the same fundamental maxims of a free 
government that other states’ revolutionary conventions had declared in 
writing, Story argues, then it made sense to draw on those principles as a 
source for interpretive inference.  Therefore “no court of justice in this 
country would be warranted in assuming, that the power to violate and 
disregard” the rights of “personal liberty and private property” was 
implied by “any general grant of . . . authority” or “general expressions of 
the will of the people,” such as those found in the historical record in 
Rhode Island.177 
Story concedes that the people of Rhode Island might have intended to 
authorize their legislature to violate the rights of personal liberty and 
property, an authorization that would be binding, but treats this as an 
unlikely historical claim that would have to be demonstrated rather than 
inferred from silence.  “The people”—here, those of Rhode Island—“ought 
not to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well 
being, without very strong and direct expressions of such an intention.”178  
 
justice in statutory construction.  See Jones v. Shore’s Ex’r, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 462, 471 
(1816) (asserting that “the words of a statute ought to be very clear” that would lead a 
court to construe a statute against “a maxim of natural justice” and “the plainest rules of 
equity”). 
 174. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 657. 
 175. Id.  Story used the same language in his Commentaries on the Constitution of 
the United States.  See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 1393, at 268 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833). 
 176. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 657. 
 177. Id. (emphasis added); see 3 STORY, supra note 175, § 1393, at 268. 
 178. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 657 (emphasis added); see 3 STORY, supra note 175, 
§ 1393, at 269 (“The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights, so vital to their 
security and well-being, without very strong and positive declarations to that effect.”). 
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To fortify this premise, Story invokes the juridical experience of Rhode 
Island’s sister states: 
We know of no case, in which a legislative act to transfer the property of A to B 
without his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of legislative 
power in any state of the union.  On the contrary, it has been constantly resisted 
as inconsistent with just principles, by every judicial tribunal in which it has 
been attempted to be enforced.179 
Story does not argue that Rhode Island is bound by the principles 
adopted by the other states; his point is that the Court should presume 
that Rhode Island acted on the same principles as its sister states in 1776 
unless there is unequivocal evidence to the contrary.  Based on all this 
circumstantial evidence and on the inferences drawn from it, the Court 
was “not prepared therefore to admit that the people of Rhode Island 
have ever delegated to their legislature the power to divest the vested 
rights of property, and transfer them [from one named individual to 
another] without the assent of the parties.”180  Thus the issue as Story 
framed it was one of historical fact, not the dictates of higher law.  In 
concluding the passage, moreover, Story reveals that it has all been 
dictum: “[C]ounsel for the plaintiffs have themselves admitted that they 
cannot contend for any such doctrine.”181 
After this digression, Story resolves the contested issues in the case in 
a straightforward manner.  The Rhode Island Act, construed “according 
to the intention of the legislature, apparent upon its face,” leaves “no 
reasonable doubt of its real object and intent . . . to confirm the sale 
made by executrix, so as to pass the title of her testator to the purchasers,” 
as the executrix had requested in her legislative petition.182  The Act did 
not divest a vested interest “in a manner inconsistent with the principles 
of [Rhode Island] law” because the devisee had taken an estate that 
under Rhode Island law was “defeasible” to the extent of any liens 
securing decedent’s debts.183  Given these conclusions, according to 
Story, the only way to uphold the decision of the lower court would be 
for the Supreme Court to declare categorically that “in a state not having 
 
 179. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 658; see 3 STORY, supra note 175, § 1393, at 268 
(“[S]ince the American revolution no state government can be presumed to possess the 
transcendental sovereignty, to take away vested rights of property.”). 
 180. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 658. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 662. 
 183. Id. at 658–59. 
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a written constitution, acts of legislation, having a retrospective 
operation, are void as to all persons not assenting thereto, even though 
they may be for beneficial purposes, and to enforce existing rights.”184  
Citing Calder v. Bull, Story denies that the Court had recognized any 
such principle.185 
I.  Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 
A missionary, convicted of violating a Georgia statute that prohibited 
whites from entering Cherokee territory without a license from the 
governor, alleged on appeal that his conviction was invalid because the 
statute violated the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
Indian affairs.186  The issue before the Court was one of personal 
liberty—the validity of the appellant’s criminal conviction—but Chief 
Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court extensively discusses the 
property rights of the Cherokee nation in concluding that Georgia’s 
legislation was invalid.  Although Marshall refers to higher law concepts 
such as “natural justice” and “original natural rights,” he nowhere 
implies that these rights have any legal authority of their own.187  Instead, as 
in Johnson v. McIntosh,188 the legal relevance of such concepts comes 
from being recognized or tacitly reflected in governmental acts.  Thus  
“natural justice” is relevant to his analysis because it is an explicit term 
in an Indian treaty.189  The Indian nations’ “original natural rights, as the 
undisputed possessors of the soil” are relevant, in Marshall’s argument, 
because they are part of the conventional understanding of the Indians’ 
land rights reflected in relevant federal treaties and laws,190 in earlier 
 
 184. Id. at 661. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 515 (1832). 
 187. Id. at 550, 559; see WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 295. 
 188. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 604 (1823). 
 189. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 550. 
 190. Id. at 559.  In addition, see id. at 556–57: 
From the commencement of our government, congress has passed acts to 
regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, 
respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which 
treaties stipulate.  All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still 
in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political 
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is 
exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is 
not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States. 
Id.; see also id. at 543 (“[P]ower, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, 
are conceded by the world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they 
descend.”). 
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laws of the State of Georgia,191 and before American independence in 
the documents and actions of colonizing nations.192 
J.  United States v. Percheman (1833) 
After Spain ceded East Florida to the United States in 1819, federal 
commissioners appointed to investigate Spanish land claims rejected the 
evidence of title presented by Juan Percheman.193  When Percheman 
nonetheless obtained a decree from a territorial court confirming his 
title, the United States appealed.194  In the course of upholding the 
decree confirming claimant’s title, Chief Justice Marshall appears to 
invoke natural rights when he declares “that sense of justice and of right 
which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be 
outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, and private 
rights annulled.”195  These civilized principles of justice are potentially 
relevant, however, only because they are embodied in the “modern usage 
of nations, which has become law,”196 and would be given direct effect 
only if the Treaty of 1819 contained “no stipulation respecting the 
property of individuals.”197  But since the Treaty does address property 
 
 191. The Court remarks: 
Georgia, herself, has furnished conclusive evidence, that her former opinions 
on this subject concurred with those entertained by her sister states, and by the 
government of the United States.  Various acts of her legislature have been 
cited in the argument, including the contract of cession made in the year 1802, 
all tending to prove her acquiescence in the universal conviction that the Indian 
nations possessed a full right to the lands they occupied, until that right should 
be extinguished by the United States, with their consent . . . . 
Id. at 560. 
 192. The Court further notes: 
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent 
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed 
possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that 
imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any 
other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular 
region claimed . . . . 
Id. at 559; see also id. at 546 (“[Colonial charters] asserted a title against Europeans 
only, and were considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were 
concerned.”). 
 193. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (6 Pet.) 51, 57 (1833). 
 194. Id. at 59. 
 195. Id. at 87; see WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 294. 
 196. Percheman, 32 US. at 86. 
 197. Id.  Chief Justice Marshall remarks, regarding Florida: 
Had Florida changed its sovereign by an act containing no stipulation 
respecting the property of individuals, the right of property in all those who 
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rights, even “the usages of the civilized world” are not binding.198  
Marshall consults them only as a presumptive guide for inferring the 
intentions of the parties to the Treaty, in the absence of persuasive 
evidence to the contrary.199 
K.  Livingston v. Moore (1833) 
A Pennsylvania Act of 1785 authorized the state comptroller to 
establish liens on the real estate of persons owing debts to the state, 
without notice to the debtor, as if the state had secured a judgment 
against the debtor in a court;200 later laws authorized the sale of property 
subject to such liens.  In federal circuit court, landowners who had purchased 
property from the debtor complained that these laws violated various 
provisions of the federal and state constitutions, and also that the 
statutory procedure for establishing the lien violated “natural justice” 
because of the lack of notice to the debtor.201  The circuit court flatly 
rejected the relevance of natural justice to the validity of a statute: 
No court has yet presumed to question a legislative act, on the ground of a 
difference with their notions of natural justice; and no legislature would, or 
ought to submit to such a restriction of their authority. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . It is the constitution that must be violated, and not any man’s opinion of 
right and wrong, or his principles of natural justice.202  . . . [The legislature is] 
 
became subjects or citizens of the new government would have been unaffected by 
the change.  It would have remained the same as under the ancient sovereign. 
Id. at 87. 
 198. Id. at 88–89. 
 199. Marshall States: 
[T]he eighth article of the treaty . . . must be intended to stipulate expressly for 
that security to private property which the laws and usages of nations would, 
without express stipulation, have conferred.  No construction which would 
impair that security further than its positive words require, would seem to be 
admissible. 
Id. at 88 (emphasis added); see id. (“The treaty . . . conform[ed] exactly to the 
universally received doctrine of the law of nations.  If the English and Spanish 
[language] parts can, without violence, be made to agree, that construction which 
establishes this conformity ought to prevail.”) (emphasis added). 
 200. Livingston v. Moore, 15 F. Cas. 677, 681–83 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830) (No. 8416), 
aff’d, 32 U.S. 469 (1833). 
 201. Id. at 682–83. 
 202. See also id. at 682 (“It would be a bold step in this, or any other court, to 
pronounce an act of a state legislature unconstitutional and void, on such general 
opinions and principles [of natural justice], however just in themselves.”). 
The circuit court further noted: 
I might think notice to be a “substantial requisite of natural justice,” but in a 
certain case, the legislature has thought otherwise; and they had a constitutional 
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charged with oppression, injustice, partiality, an injurious departure from the 
ordinary modes of proceeding, and a total disregard to the rights and interests of 
others in the pursuit of the rights and interests of the state.  If all this were true, 
there may nevertheless be evils for which we are not authorized to administer a 
remedy; there may be injuries we cannot redress . . . our power over the subject 
is measured to us by the constitution, and we must take care that in our zeal to 
redress real or supposed wrongs, we do not commit a greater wrong.203 
The challenged laws must be enforced, the court declared, unless “they 
violate any of the provisions of the constitution of the United States, or 
of the constitution of Pennsylvania, and are so inconsistent with them, or 
either of them, that it is the right and duty of the court to declare them to 
be null and void.”204 
In the Supreme Court the debtor’s heirs again argued, among other 
grounds, that the state legislation was “inconsistent with the principles of 
private rights and natural justice, and therefore void,” aside from any 
violation of a constitutional provision.205  In affirming the result below, 
the Court ignored the natural justice claim.206 
Justice Johnson, however, after delivering the opinion of the Court, 
gives his own reasons for concurring.207  Unlike the rest of the Court, which 
ignores plaintiffs’ extratextual challenge to the Pennsylvania legislation, 
and the circuit court below, which had condemned the idea of using “natural 
justice” to determine the validity of statutes,208 Johnson addresses the 
substance of plaintiffs’ arguments from “the principles of private rights 
and natural justice.”209  Justice Johnson does not say that natural justice 
is ordinarily relevant to the question of a statute’s constitutionality; his 
 
right to think so, and to act upon their own opinion of this abstract question, as 
well as of its application to the case they were providing for. 
Id. at 683; see Beach v. Woodhull, 2 F. Cas. 1104, 1105 (C.C.D.N.J. 1803) (No. 1154) 
(Washington, J.) (“The law is clearly retrospective and unjust in its operation, but it is 
not for this court to correct it, or declare it a nullity.  It is not repugnant to the constitution.”). 
 203. Livingston, 15 F. Cas. at 683, 685. 
 204. Id. at 685. 
 205. Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 540 (1833). 
 206. The Court stated: 
[T]he words used in the constitution of Pennsylvania, in declaring the extent of 
the powers of its legislature, are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the 
powers exercised over the estate of Nicholson in the two acts under 
consideration, and that there are no restrictions, either express or implied, in 
that constitution, sufficient to control and limit the general terms of the grant of 
legislative power to the bounds which the plaintiffs would prescribe to it. 
Id. at 546. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Livingston, 15 F. Cas. at 683, 685. 
 209. Livingston, 32 U.S. at 540. 
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point is that if Pennsylvania’s courts recognize natural justice as part of 
the “law of the land,” the federal courts must accept this as part of the 
state’s fundamental law.210 
Johnson first counters plaintiffs’ argument that the Pennsylvania legislation 
was inconsistent with “the reason and nature of things” because it was 
“inconsistent” with the original “contract of grant” and was effectively 
“a resumption of the land.”211  Johnson answers: 
[S]ubjecting the lands of a grantee to the payment of his debts, can never impair 
or contravene the rights derived to him under his grant, for in the very act, the 
full effect of the transfer of interest to him is recognized and asserted: because it 
is his, is the direct and only reason for subjecting it to his debts.212 
Evidently the “things” whose “reason and nature” Johnson views as 
relevant to natural justice here are matters of ordinary domestic law—
land grants and creditors’ remedies—rather than principles of higher 
law.  This is consistent with Johnson’s own use of the phrase “reason 
and nature of things” in Fletcher v. Peck213 and in Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee,214 and with the use of this apparently conventional phrase by 
others.215 
 
 210. See id. at 542 (“When [federal courts] find principles distinctly settled by 
adjudications, and known and acted upon as the law of the land, we have no more right 
to question them, or deviate from them, than could be correctly exercised by their own 
tribunals.”).  In the circuit court, plaintiffs had cited a Pennsylvania case for the 
proposition that statutes must conform to “natural justice.”  See Livingston, 15 F. Cas. at 
682–83 (quoting Fitler’s Case, 12 Serg. & Rawle 277, 278–79 (Pa. 1825)). 
 211. Livingston, 32 U.S. at 550. 
 212. Id. at 550–51. 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 101–111. 
 214. 14 U.S. 304, 372 (1816).  Justice Johnson remarks: 
It must here be recollected, that this is an action of ejectment.  If the term 
formally declared upon expires pending the action, the court will permit the 
plaintiff to amend, by extending the term—why?  Because, although the right 
may have been in him at the commencement of the suit, it has ceased before 
judgment, and without this amendment he could not have judgment.  But 
suppose the suit were really instituted to obtain possession of a leasehold, and 
the lease expire before judgment, would the court permit the party to amend in 
opposition to the right of the case?  On the contrary, if the term formally 
declared on were more extensive than the lease in which the legal title was 
founded, could they give judgment for more than costs?  It must be recollected 
that, under this judgment, a writ of restitution is the fruit of the law.  This, in its 
very nature, has relation to, and must be founded upon, a present existing right 
at the time of judgment.  And whatever be the cause which takes this right 
away, the remedy must, in the reason and nature of things, fall with it. 
Id. at 371–72 (emphasis added). 
 215. Hamilton had used the phrase in describing how courts decide which of two 
inconsistent statutes should be given effect: 
The rule which has obtained in the courts for determining their relative validity 
is that the last in order of time shall be preferred to the first.  But this is mere 
rule of construction, not derived from any positive law, but from the nature 
and reason of the thing.  It is a rule not enjoined upon the courts by legislative 
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The other claim that Johnson characterizes as based on “the principles 
of private rights and natural justice”216 is that “in this case the community 
sits in judgment in its own cause, when it affirms the debt to be due for 
 
provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth and propriety, for 
the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the law.  They thought it 
reasonable, that between the interfering acts of an equal authority, that which 
was the last indication of its will, should have the preference. 
   But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority, 
of an original and derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate 
the converse of that rule as proper to be followed.  They teach us that the prior 
act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and 
subordinate authority . . . . 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 526 (emphasis added). 
In Opinion of the Justices, 14 Mass. 470 (1784), the court considered whether the state 
legislature had the power to fill vacancies in the Council, in the absence of an explicit 
constitutional provision to that effect: 
It seems very clear . . . that the constitution designed those offices should be 
always filled, and that a council of nine persons should exist; and that in one 
case of a vacancy, arising by an implied resignation, it is expressly provided 
that it shall be filled up; which, from the reason and nature of things, implies a 
constitutional power of filling up seats directly and positively vacated by death 
or actual resignation. 
Opinion of the Justices, 14 Mass. at 471 (second emphasis added); see Griswold v. 
Stewart, 4 Cow. 457, 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) (“The rule, that nothing which was a 
defense to the original action can be pleaded in scire facias, applies only to the original 
parties or to privies, not strangers.  This is evident from the reason and nature of things.” 
(second emphasis added)).  In Emery v. Neighbour, 7 N.J.L. 142 (N.J. 1824), the court 
was faced with a trust instrument whose terms did not expressly give a beneficiary the 
power to make a testamentary disposition: 
Do they then do so in the reason and nature of things?  The money is to be 
paid to the trustees, for her sole, separate, and exclusive use; it is to be paid in 
consideration of her relinquishment of her conjugal rights, generally the most 
precious, and by far the most important of all the rights that woman can 
possess; it is to be paid as a sum in gross, not in annual, monthly, or weekly 
payments, nor as a principal to raise an annual interest for her annual support; 
it is to be subject, in the hands of the trustees, to her sole order and disposition. 
   It would be difficult to find words to create an estate, in money, for the 
separate use of the femme, of more extensive and unlimited import. 
Id. at 148 (first emphasis added).  In Davies v. Powell, 125 Eng. Rep. 1013, 1014 (C.P. 
1738), the court gave the following reasons for departing from a traditional common law 
rule holding that deer were not distrainable: 
[T]he nature of things may in time change; it is now well known [deer] are 
become chattels of profit, and the practice of grasing so general, as to be 
deemed a good improvement of a farm; the reason of this thing therefore being 
altered, the law must vary with it. 
   We are all agreed, that these deer upon all the circumstances of this case, 
were properly distrainable. 
Id. 
 216. Livingston, 32 U.S. at 540. 
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which the land is subjected to sale, and then subjects the land to sale to 
satisfy its own decision thus rendered.”217  Johnson’s response to this 
claim indicates that he understands plaintiffs’ challenge to depend on 
assessing the purposes and effects of ordinary legal phenomena rather 
than deductions from higher law: 
This view of the acts of the state, is clearly not to be sustained by a reference to 
the facts of the case.  As to the judgment of 1797, that is unquestionably a 
judicial act; and as to the settled accounts, the lien is there created by the act of 
men who, quoad hoc, were acting in a judicial character; and their decision 
being subjected to an appeal to the ordinary, or rather the highest of the 
tribunals of the country, gives to those settlements a decided judicial character: 
and were it otherwise, how else are the interests of the state to be protected?  
The body politic has its claims upon the constituted authorities, as well as 
individuals; and if the plaintiffs’ course of reasoning could be permitted to 
prevail, it would then follow, that provision might be made for collecting the 
debts of every one else, but those of the state must go unpaid, whenever 
legislative aid became necessary to both.  This would be pushing the reason and 
nature of things beyond the limits of natural justice.218 
L.  Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Van Ness (1835) 
After an act of Congress authorized a railroad to condemn land in the 
District of Columbia, an affected landowner brought suit challenging the 
statute’s validity.219  One of the grounds for challenge was that the 
statute took “private property for private use, which is not authorized by 
the constitution.”220  Circuit Judge Cranch states that taking private 
property “for private use, with just compensation” is “not within the 
prohibition of the constitution” but “would be an arbitrary proceeding.”221  
In determining whether or not the statute effectively takes property for 
private use, Cranch considers the statute’s purposes, its effects, and the 
logical implications of other statutes governing the railroad’s operations: 
 
 217. Id. at 551.  A law authorizing one to judge in his own case was one of Chief 
Justice Coke’s examples of a statute contrary to “common right and reason” that “the 
common law adjudges . . . as to that point void.”  Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 
653 (K.B. 1610); see id. at 654 (“[I]f any Act of Parliament gives to any to hold . . . pleas 
arising before him within his manor of D., yet he shall hold no plea, to which he himself 
is a party . . . .”).  See also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND *91: 
[I]f an act of parliament gives a man power to try all causes, that arise within 
his manor . . . ; yet, if a cause should arise in which he himself is party, the act 
is construed not to extend to that; because it is unreasonable that any man 
should determine his own quarrel. 
Id. 
 218. Livingston, 32 U.S. at 551 (emphasis added). 
 219. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. 574 (C.C.D.C.1835) (No. 830). 
 220. Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. at 575–76. 
 221. Id. at 576. 
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[T]his railroad, although it may be profitable to the stockholders, is also a great 
public benefit.  It does not prevent the public from enjoying all the advantages 
which they enjoyed before, and gives them a cheaper, safer, and more expeditious 
mode of travelling than they would otherwise have.  If it may not be called a 
common highway, yet it is really a common good.  It is a great public convenience.  
The land is really taken for public use.  The condemnation of land, for such 
purposes, has been so general, and so extensive, for many years, that it may well 
be considered as established by the law of the land.  Every state of the Union 
has granted charters for such objects, with similar powers.  The rates of toll, 
&c., are established by law, which could not be done unless the object was of a 
public nature; nor would the legislature have power to restrain them in the 
exercise of their private rights.  The state of Maryland also has a great interest in 
the road, as it is to receive five per cent. upon the gross receipts of tolls from 
passengers; and has an option to take a large portion of the stock within a 
limited time after the completion of the road.  The condemnation of the land, 
therefore, is clearly for the Maryland public use; even if it be not for the use of 
the whole American public.222 
Concluding, the court says that the statute does not contravene “any of 
the principles of natural justice,”223 but, not having used the term earlier, 
leaves it unclear what it means by natural justice.  The opinion seems to 
suggest that the statute does not contravene natural justice because it is 
not “arbitrary,”224 and that the statute is not arbitrary because even though 
 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id.  Other federal opinions show the term natural justice being used to mean 
that a result is reasonable in the context of relevant doctrinal principles, rather than as the 
application of higher law reasoning.  See The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 438–39 (1815) 
(Story, J.): 
The resistance of the convoy is the resistance of all the ships associated under 
the common protection, without any distinction whether the convoy belong to 
the same or to a foreign, neutral sovereign—for upon the principles of natural 
justice, a neutral is justly chargeable with the acts of the party, which he 
voluntarily adopts, or, of which he seeks the shelter and protection. . . . —these 
principles are recognized . . . ; and can never be shaken without delivering over 
to endless controversy and conflict the maritime rights of the world. 
Id. (emphasis added).  See also Greene v. Darling, 10 F. Cas. 1144, 1147–48 (C.C.R.I. 
1828) (No. 5765) (Story, J.): 
   The strong impression left upon my mind by other authorities is, that Lord 
Mansfield's doctrine, as to the jurisdiction of set-off in equity, is not in its 
general latitude, and without some qualifications, maintainable.  It seems 
irreconcileable with what fell from Lord Cowper, in Lanesborough v. Jones, 1 
P. Wms. 326, who said, that “it was natural justice and equity, that in all cases 
of mutual credit only the balance should be paid;” . . . .  Lord Cowper here 
relies on the fact of mutual credit, (by which I understand him to intend, a 
credit founded on a knowledge of, and trust to, the existing debts,) as itself, in 
a case of insolvency, furnishing an equity. . . . 
   The conclusion, which seems deducible from the general current of the 
English decisions . . . is, that courts of equity will set off distinct debts, where 
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the railroad might be “a private object, in itself” its overall character is 
sufficiently public because the legislature “[has] deemed it to be so far a 
public object as to be worthy of their control and regulation, and of the 
exercise of their power to apply private property to its use, upon making 
just compensation, to be ascertained by a jury”225 and because such 
statutes are so widespread in America that their legitimacy “may well be 
considered as established by the law of the land.”226 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The early federal courts are commonly regarded as having been 
remarkably innovative in that they practiced judicial review without any 
real authorization for doing so, they used judicial review to define property 
rights much more expansively than would have been anticipated, and 
they used timeless principles of natural or higher law to accomplish 
this.  I argue that the early federal courts were far less creative than this 
account suggests.  The Framers of the Federal Constitution seem to have 
anticipated that the new federal courts would exercise the power of 
judicial review without requiring specific authorization in a written 
constitution.  The Framers also seem to have expected that the federal 
courts would employ the power of judicial review to protect some 
conventional property rights not stated in constitutional provisions, but 
stopping short of higher law.  Finally, I contend, the pertinent case law 
shows that the early federal courts essentially stayed within the Framers’ 
expectations in these respects.  In determining the validity of statutes 
affecting property rights, these courts drew on certain principles they 
regarded as inherited from the English legal tradition or took to be 
shared in common among the American constitutions, but they did not 
rely on higher law for this purpose. 
 
 
there has been a mutual credit, upon the principles of natural justice, to avoid 
circuity of suits, following the doctrine of compensation of the civil law to a 
limited extent. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 225. Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. at 576.  The court continues, “[W]e cannot say that the 
provisions of the act, which authorize the condemnation of land, for such a road, are 
void, as being unconstitutional, or as contravening any of the principles of natural 
justice.”  Id.  The court cites Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 3 U.S. 304, 312 (C.C.E.D. 
Pa. 1795) as illustrating the scope of a Pennsylvania constitutional provision formally 
recognizing a natural right to possess property, not as showing a court’s direct 
application of a natural rights principle.  Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. at 576. 
 226. Id. 
